



1. History and basics
The Constitution of Hungary, drawn up according to the
Soviet model, had not regulated the national armed forces
for four decades, from 1949 until the Transition in 1989.
The national armed forces were regulated by lower-level
legislation like the National Security Act1 – which ruled the
operation of the Hungarian People’s Army – or the statutory
decree on the State and Public Security.2
First of all, the terminology of the topic needs to be
clarified: namely, law enforcement and protection of public
order. Sometimes even the academic literature uses these
terms as synonyms, even though they do not mean the
same thing. The theoretical debate of this question is not
closed, relationship of the definitions and the meanings of
them are still not clear. According to the opinion of
advocators of the definition of law enforcement, it is part of
public administration, which is for detection and prevention
of infringements using legitimate force. Notwithstanding
this, the school of protection of public order has started to
use the expression protection of public order body in 1990,
which emphasises its military character (termination of
service, the uniform and the right to be armed, a strict
hierarchy, etc.). It is understood that the second is better
related to defence. The definition of protection of public
order was used first in 1993 in the National Security Act.3
This legislation set out first the protection of public order
bodies such as the police, the civil national security
services, the prison service, customs and the finance
guard, civil protection and the professional, national and
municipal fire services. The legislator emphasised that
these services work in some tasks of national security as
well.4 The Police Act5 of 1994 uses the terminology
“protection of public order body” but in contrast to the
National Security Act it sets out the border guard as well.
With the expression protection of public order body
(meaning military character, centralisation and hierarchy)
the “old regime” appears, even though the legislator
emphasised the importance of demilitarisation of services.
The issue was decided in the Termination of Service Act. 6
It was declared that the failure of demilitarisation is based
on the purpose of building military protection of public
order. Thereafter more than 300 pieces of legislation
applied the expressions protection of public order and
protection of public order body without defining them. Even
the bodies meant under the expression were not defined.
As the title of this chapter shows I accept the terminology of
law enforcement, regarding it as part of public
administration, and I use it consistently. Nevertheless I
would like to declare that according to my opinion law
enforcement is not only police administration; it means a
more complex activity, the implementation of which is
shared between police service and other services.
The Constitution of Hungary used the expression of law
enforcement yet, although according to the functioning of
national armed forces (army, police) was regulated
separately from public administration, in hierarchical order,
with centralised confirmation, in termination of service –
following military principles.7 The Constitutional
Amendment of 2004 (Act CIV of 2004) brought the
expression protection of public order body into the
Constitution (change of terminology), until then in Chapter
VIII “Armed forces and the police force” was used. Armed
forces were the army and the border guard. For better
understanding, it must be mentioned that the border guard
became a body with two legal bases – military and law
enforcement – through the amendments of the Constitution
in the 1990s. A few years after socialism, this reasonable
distress ran foul of the constitutional principle that forbids
armed bodies to fulfil order-protection tasks. The
Constitutional Amendment of 2004 has abrogated this
situation and brought the terminology protection of public
order body in.
The citation from 2009 states:
According to the original constitutional purpose, the
regulation of armed bodies and the police force is
already partly operative, then just some of the order
protection bodies are regulated by them together
with the Army.8
This appears in the Constitution of 2011 as well – Article
40/A-C rules the army and the police force, but does not
regulate the other protection of public order bodies. The
Constitution has never included the protection of public
order bodies. Chapter VIII, which contained these rules,
was amended the most times during the two decades
since the Transition in 1989. Even the title of the chapter
went through a kind of metamorphosis in this period. A
smaller technical legal mistake was to write in the original
text the word police without capital letter in the title of the
chapter, when it was written with capitals in the Police Act.
A unique solution was the amendment of the title, the word
“police” was deleted, so the expression of usual protection
of public order body was brought into use. In the text the
word “police” has been modified “quietly”.
2. Constitutional framework
The principle of legality means that law-enforcement
authorities have to exercise their powers in the way, form
and coverage that legislations order. This incorporates the
observance of procedural requirements in police
measures. The aggrievements of procedural requirements
are strictly adjudicated.9 On the other hand, other
legislations – regulations, decisions – have to conform with
the principle of legality. Supreme Court Decision No.
1/1999 said that exercising law enforcement – declared in
the Police Act – is administrative activity. Police forces –
according to their public power – take measures by
unilateral declarations and lay charges on customers that
are validated by them.10 Legal clarification of an outside
police measure is quite problematic and it can be
understood as an immediately enforced oral decision. This
is the reason why rules and effective legal remedies are so
important.
The legislature kept the processing of legal remedy for
police measure (complaint) within the organisation;
passing judgment is the task of the measuring body’s
leader. Judging on appeal against decision of complaint is
the task of the inspector.11 There are two more alternatives
for citizens: the Law Enforcement College of Complaint and
the judicial way in special cases.12 It is a usual practice
abroad – for example in Germany – that against police
measures legal action can be taken immediately.
Literature has no standard opinion on the question of the
principle of opportunity. According to certain views law-
enforcement authorities have to perform their tasks – when
somebody or something is in danger – with “deliberation in
duty bound”, even though it is known that deliberation can
be used just in accordance with its purpose. “Deliberation
in duty bound” is a described definition in Prussian law:
authorisation that gives right to the police force to decide
the method and degree of intervention. This interpretation
can cause significant anomalies or even abuse.
Another view of the principle of opportunity appears in
Prussian law. Law-enforcement authorities can dispense
with interpretation or with a method of it when it would be
unfeasible under the circumstances. The principle of
deliberation appears in this doctrine too, although it cannot
be used in criminal-law enforcement. The principle of
legality has to prevail in criminal actions. To draw a
conclusion, it is ascertainable that the problem of principles
“legality – opportunity” reduces the question of how broad a
right of deliberation the security forces (police) should have.
Principle of legality has to succeed in the activity of security
forces (police); it cannot be diluted by the principle of
opportunity.
It is useful in this context to analyse the decisions of the
Constitutional Court of Hungary regarding law-enforcement
aspects. Protection of public order and public security
(former maintenance of public security and protection of
internal order) as the basic task of the police force are
constitutional purposes as well. According to the
interpretation of the Supreme Court this means the
assurance of constitutional working of social bodies and
undisturbed public life and additionally it means the
protection of citizens’ fundamental rights together with
personal and property security.13
It is primarily important in a constitutional approach to law
enforcement that fundamental rights be enforced and the
problem of abridgement is considered. As the
Constitutional Court sets out, the
state can use abridgement only under the
circumstance when protection or enforcement of
other rights, or affecting other constitutional purpose,
cannot be achieved in any other way, and it can be
just as broadcast as definitely needed. Significant
abridgement of fundamental rights can be used
when it happens without force and if it is not in
proportion with the importance of the wished
purpose. Legislature has to apply the lightest
implement to achieve its certain purpose. If the
abridgement is inappropriate in achieving its
purpose, the offence of fundamental rights can be
ascertained.14
It is the concept of “necessity and proportionality” that is
used consistently in the adjudication of the magistrate
body. The usual test of necessity and proportionality is an
abstract methodology rule, which is used in certain cases,
for certain statutes, in relation to the subjects protected by
the fundamental rights at issue in each case.15 The test has
three parts. Firstly, the legitimate purpose of legislator,
examining the logical connection of constitutional cause of
abridgement, purpose and implement. Secondly, necessity,
whether abridgement is inevitable, the analysis of forcing
cause. And thirdly, proportionality, it has to be decided
whether abridgement and its purpose are in relation. These
three aspects are equal; either of them can cause
unconstitutionality.16
Alluding to the settled case-law, the Constitutional Court’s
Decision 22/1992 CC says that “abridgement of
fundamental rights is constitutional under that
circumstances when it does not affect the basic entity of it,
when it is inevitable, so it has force causes, furthermore
when the significance of abridgement is not out of
proportion as compared to its purpose”.17 It cannot be
overlooked that, as the Constitutional Court pointed out,
law-enforcement bodies work as militarised, hierarchical
and centralised organisations, separated from
administration.
One of the most problematic parts of law-enforcement
functionality is the engagement of enforcing illegal
command. The Constitutional Court has pointed out the
following: “engagement of enforcing illegal command,
which would be naturally unconstitutional in civil sphere (in
connection with armed forces), cannot be considered
unconstitutional in itself, without any quest”.18
The Court of Justice of the European Union and the
European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg have
examined mainly the Police Act and the Termination of
Service Act,19 but because of the limited extent of this text
they are not explained here.
3. Contrasting changes of the texts
First of all, I focus on the changes introduced by the new
Basic Law. In the Constitution the last title of Chapter VIII
was: “The Hungarian Army and Law Enforcement Bodies”.
As it has been mentioned above, even this title and the
whole Chapter VIII has been changed many times during
the last two decades. “This chapter title is one of the nadirs
of constitutional regulation (actually its shame)” wrote
András Patyi in the Commentary on the Constitution.
•  The first – maybe the most significant – change is the
partition of regulation of the Hungarian Army and the
police force. Article 45 of the new Basic Law regulates
the army and Article 46 regulates the police force and the
national security forces. In addition, I would like to note
that it could be a really interesting grammatical essay to
examine how the use of an initial capital letter on the
word “police” affects constitution-making. Until the end of
2011 the Constitution used it with a capital letter but from
1 January 2012 we will use a small first letter in
accordance with the new Basic Law.
•  It can be considered as a leap forward that Article 46
does not use the terminology protection of public order
body anymore. However, we notice later that this delight
was baseless: Article 53 – about the former defensive
situation – uses the expression, and so maintains the
constitutional status of it, without any definition. Using this
expression by the Basic Law without definition can cause
uncertainty. Maybe the limited extent of the text was the
main cause of this situation, but under these
circumstances it would not have been necessary to use
this problematic expression.
•  Article 46 sets more details concerning the tasks of
police force than the Constitution. Next to the classical
functions of preserving public order and public security,
preventing and detecting crime has been drawn up, too.
The extension can be seen as classical law-enforcement
functions have been set out, because preventing crime
can be identified with presence, guarding over and
applying legal physical force; while detecting can be
matched with the obtaining of information, as with
criminal law enforcement. According to experts on the
subject, the expression of state border protection does
not harmonise with the demands of the EU and with the
Schengen Agreement.20 The main point is that according
to the demands of the EU and the Schengen Agreement
police force – as the successor of the former border
guard – has responsibility for guarding the state border
and maintaining its order and control of cross-border
traffic, but the protection of the state border is not part of
it. The workings of the police force are inferior to the
government, as it used to be.
•  The specification of basic tasks of national security
forces are a new aspect of the Basic Law. According to
the Basic Law the main duty of national security forces is
the protection of Hungary’s independence and order and
assertion of its national security interests. It works under
the Government. Accepting that national security is a
special form of obtaining information and its functioning
raises many unpleasant questions; this text alteration can
be evaluated as the legislature intended to raise the
regulation of this field to the constitutional level.
•  It is not a new rule in the Basic Law that professional
members of the police force and national security forces
are forbidden to be members of the party or to carry out
political activity. The special meaning of this rule is
regulated in the Termination of Service Act. 21 In Chapter
III of this Act about the abridgement of fundamental rights
– among others, abridgements of freedom of speech
and assembly – these are defined in connection with
termination of service.
•  As it is “usual”, organisation, functioning and other
special rules of the police force and national security
forces – like conditions of using secret service’s devices
and methods or the rules of national security activity –
are regulated in statute law.
In comparison with other EU Member States’ constitutions
it can be ascertained that there are significant differences
between law-enforcement regulations of these constitutions
and the new Basic Law of Hungary. Some of these charts
regulate the organisation and functioning of law
enforcement in details, while others do not even mention
them.22 On the basis of this fact, there are three groups of
Member States. In the first group constitutions regulate law
enforcement in detail. This is the “positive constitutional
regulation” of law enforcement. The Austrian Constitution,
for example, is in this group.
In the second group, constitutions specify the legal
framework of administration but do not go into detail on
law-enforcement authorities; this is the indirect regulation of
law-enforcement administration. This is typical of Finland’s
constitution. The constitutional base of security is in the
regulation of administration’s framework in the Constitution
and the limits of police power. Constitutional rules are a
firm base for the functioning of protection of public order,
whereas the protection of public-order bodies is not even
mentioned in the text.
The third group has a different logical order than the first
two. These contain the list of fundamental rights in detail, so
contain indirectly what forces can do. This is true even
when the measure of force is in the interest of protecting
public order and public security. This is the “negative
constitutional regulation” of law enforcement. The
constitution of Belgium contains specified regulations
neither for law enforcement, the police force nor for
administration, but it contains several rules for fundamental
rights.
The new Basic Law of Hungary can be categorised in the
first group, as it specifies the most important blocks of the
police force, which is the essential element of law
enforcement.
Consequently, it can be ascertained that during the creation
of the new Basic Law, law enforcement was not one of the
most stressed topics where significant modifications have
been accomplished. It is not surprising that compared to
the former legislation the new act does not contain many
significant new aspects.
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